Formulating economic policy for 1979 and beyond: old problems and new constraints by Keith M. Carlson
Formulating Economic Policy for 1979
and Beyond: Old Problems and New Constraints
KEITH M. CARLSON
HE Administration recently outlined its economic
strategy for 1979 and 1980, and also addressed some
of the longer-term economic problems that will face
the United States in the early 1980s.’ The major
problem confronting the Administration has become
familiar — reducing inflation without provoking a
recession. This problem has been complicated, how-
ever, by recently enacted legislation, the Full Em-
ployment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978 (Hum-
phrey-Hawkins) and the Revenue Act of 1978.
The Humphrey-Hawkins Act includes national eco-
nomic goals for 1983 among its provisions. In partic-
ular, the Act calls for
(1) reducing the rate of unemployment to not more
than 3 percent for individuals aged twenty and
over and 4 percent for individuals aged sixteen
and over;
(2) reducing the rate of inflation to not more than
3 percent.
The Act also contains the proviso that policies and
programs for reducing the rate of inflation be de-
signed so as not to impede achievement of the goals
and timetables specified for the reduction of
unemployment.
The responsibility for achieving these goals belongs
to the President of the United States. He must sub-
mit an economic report and a budget which out-
line the programs and policies deemed necessary to
achieve the goals of the Act.
The Act also indicates a role for monetary policy.
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem is required to present to Congress the relation-
ship between its plans and the short-term goals
presented in the President’s economic report. The
Federal Reserve is required only to specify its plans
for the coming year, and need mit outline its actions
for the longer term through 1983.
The Revenue Act of 1978 imposed an additional set
of constraints on the Administration’s policymaking
iThe Administration~seconomic plans are contained in two
basic documents, the Budget of the United States Govern-
ment for Fiscal Year 1980 and the Economic Report of the
President, which also includes the 1979 Annual Report of the
Council of Economic Advisers,
process. This Act was designed primarily to reduce
taxes to stimulate consumer and investment spending
and to improve the equity of the tax system. However,
the Act also contains a Congressional policy state-
ment about the growth rate of Federal outlays and
possible further tax reduction:
•..as a matter of national policy the rate of growth
in Federal outlays, adjusted for inflation, should not
exceed 1 percent per year between fiscal year 1979
and fiscal year 1983; Federal outlays as a percentage
of gross national product should decline to below
21 percent in fiscal year 1980, 20.5 percent in fiscal
year 1981, 20 percent in fiscal year 1982, and 19.5
percent in fiscal year 1983; and the Federal budget
should be balanced in fiscal years 1982 and 1983.
The President presented the first economic program
under the provisions of this new legislation to Con-
gress and the public in January. The details of the
program are outlined in the Budget of the United
States Government for Fiscal Year 1980 and the Eco-
nomic Report of the President. The Federal Reserve
submitted its report to Congress in a Letter of Trans-
mittal dated February 20, 1979. This article summa-
rizes and evaluates the Administration’s economicplan
along with the Federal Reserve’s statement of intent.
The focus is on whether these monetary and fiscal
plans are consistent with the achievement of the goals
of the Humphrey-Hawkins Act and the Revenue Act
of 1978.
In order to prepare a national economic program,
one must consider the current economic situation and
the stance of monetary and fiscal policy. In addition,
it is helpful to understand how the economic situation
evolved in light of past policy developments.
In April 1978, the U.S. economy entered the fourth
year of expansion.2 Strong economic growth and em-
2Economic developments in 1978 are reviewed in the 1979
CEA Report, Chapters 1 and 2. See also Michael E. Trebing,
“Economic Developments in 1978,” this Review (February
1979), pp. 11-18.
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Table I
Selected Economic Indicators; 1978
111/77 IV!?? 1/78 11/78 11/78
to to to to to
PY/77 /78 11/78 III 78 IV/fl
Gross National Product
Current Dollars (Total Spending) 8.9% 7.196 20.6% 9.69’o 15.6%
Personal Consumption Expenditures 14.1 7.0 15.3 10.7 14.6
Nonresidential Fixed Investment 14.8 11.0 31.3 14.1 18.0
Residential Investment 27.5 0.4 21.5 1 •.8 17.2
Government Purchases
Federal 15.5 ‘ 1.8 10.9 19.8 24.0
State and Local 12.6 7.1 20.1 12.3 9.0
1972 Dollars (Output) 3.2 —0.1 8.7 2.6 69
Prices
GNP Deflator 5.5 7.2 11.0 6.9 8.2
Consumer Price Index
1
5.1 8.0 9.9 8.8 9.2
Producer Price Index 59 9.4 11.3 6.7 10.6
Industrial Commodities 5.6 7.0 8.3 8 6 9.2
Farm Products and Processed Foods and Feeds 7.8 19.1 22.2 1.0 17.2
Labor Market
Employment
Total 5.1 4.6 4.4 2.7 3.8
Payroll 4.0 3.8 6.9 2.1 4.0
Lobor Utilization (End of Period)
Employment Ratio
2
66.1 66.5 67.1 67.3 67.7
Unemployment Rote 6.6 6.2 6.0 6.0 5.8
No’ru ‘Ii fianres arc coinill nile.I anns.id rates sit’ rhni .‘‘r cc::t I tim Ias:~ did’. iridicators.
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the ~.9 percent pace in the pre\ miss ‘ear. Total em— particular niarkets and alt generall\ , Inst not ahVas s,
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Spending ucreased at a lob percent ariiitsal late In
the fourth quarter which was distrihuted as a 6.9 per— GNP 11.0% 10.9% 11.7%
cent rate of advance output and an ~.2percent rate Output 4.7 4.1 4.0
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Unemployms.nt rote 6.3 6.0 6.0
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Table Ill
Selected Policy and Credit Market Indicators: 1978
Ill/i? lV/77 1/78 11/78 111/78
to to to to to
lV/77 5/78 11/78 111/78 IV/78
Fiscal Policy
Federal Expenditures 13.0% 4.3% -0.4% 15.3% 17.7%
Purchases 15.5 -1.8 -10.9 19.8 24.0
Transfer Payments 6.1 4,3 1.1 19.2 6.3
High-EmploymentSurplus/Deficit as Percent of
Potential GNP (End of Period) -2.2 1.6 0.9 -—0.8 1.0
Monetary Policy
Monetary Base 9.5 10.3 8.1 9.8 9.9
Ml 7.6 6.8 9.6 8.4 4.4
M2 8.1 7.1 8.7 10.3 7.9
credit Market (End of Period)
Federal Funds Rotc 6.51 6.76 7.28 8.10 9.58
4.6 Month commercial Paper Rote 6.59 6.80 7.20 8.08 9.90
corporate Aoo Bond Rate 8.10 8.45 8.67 8.75 9.03
sor r-; Fi”u it”- 1,.r lAuclerai Es~ mlit u “N s:nI Siuuuueiai-y PoFs-y I” ci lent irs u,ri (‘urnr’oorudusi :u,:nuual uats” si’ change.
related to unexpected shocks on the supply or produc- profit margins and thereby encouraged price hikes.
don side of the economy. Some of the special factors In comparison, unit labor costs rose 6.7 percent in
which had an important influence on inflation in 1978 1977.
were food prices, the depreciation of the dollar, and
housing costs. The CEA pointed out, though that The sluggish pace of productivity in 1978 led the
these special factors fall short of providing a complete CEA to reassess productivity trends in recent years.
explanation for the acceleration of inflation in 1978.~ This resulted in a downward revision of their esti-
mates of potential GNP from mid-1973 through 1978.
Most of the acceleration, it contends, was caused by According to these revised estimates, the economy has
a substantial increase in the “underlying rate of in- been operating much nearer its potential in recent
flation,” defined as the rise in prices, excluding food years than previously had been thought.°
and energy. According to the CEA, changes in the
underlying rate of inflation are closely tied to move-
ments in unit labor costs. The rise in unit labor costs
in 1978 was “explained” by an acceleration of money Monetary and fiscal actions are important factors in
wages and a sluggish advance in productivity. Noney evaluating past and prospective economic conditions.
wages accelerated because excess demand developed Both monetary and fiscal policy tend to affect the pace
in labor markets, as indicated by a rapid decline in of economic activity with a lag, so their recent trends
unemployment. The demand for labor exceeded labor are important in formulating an economic outlook
force growth, which reflected increases on the demand and in developing policies for the near future.
or spending side of the economy. The CEA sug-
gested that the January 1978 increase in the minimum Although there are various measures of fiscal action,
wage also contributed to wage acceleration. the growth of Federal expenditures is possibly the
most meaningful measure of fiscal stimulus or re-
The fundamental development underlying the ac- straint.°An examination of this growth in 1978 (Table
celerating inflation in 1978, according to the CEA’s III) indicates that fiscal policy became relatively re-
analysis, was the slow growth of productivity. For
the private nonfarm business sector, the 0.5 percent iiThe newly revised CEA series on potential CNP is now quite
increase in output per hour in 1978, in conjunction similar in magnitude to that developed by Robert H. Rasche
with a 9.3 percent increase in wages, meant that unit ~J1 ~j~’ ~ and Potential GNP,”
labor costs rose 8.7 percent, which placed pressure on 6Leonall C. Andersen and Jerry L, Jordan, Monetary and
Fiscal Actions: A Tqst of Their Relative hswortance in Eco- 4F’or a contrasting analysis, see Albert E. Burger, “Is Inflation nomic Stabilization, this Review (November 1968), pp.
Alt Due to Money?” this Review (December 1978), pp. 8-12. 11-24,
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strictive in the first half of the year but sharply
expansionary in the second half.
Monetary policy, on the other hand, was clearly
expansionary throughout most of 1978.~This was a
continuation of the rapid monetary expansion that
began in late 1976 and carried through 1977. Growth
rates of Ml and M2 were well above their long-term
trends until late in the year (Table III). Only then
did the growth of these aggregates slow, which indi-
cates that monetary actions were turning restrictive
or, at least, less expansionary.
NN
The economic outlook for the next year or two
depends primarily on one’s assessment of the econ-
omy’s momentum. The forecast, however, also de-
pends on one’s framework of analysis since this
framework provides the link between policy actions
and economic activity. Policy recommendations will
vary depending on whether movements in economic
activity are attributable to monetary and fiscal policy
or to exogenous forces beyond the control of the
policymaker.
The CEA has forecast a growth in GNP of 9.8
percent from fourth quarter 1978 to fourth quarter
1979 (Table IV) to be distributed as a 2.2 percent
advance in output and a 7.4 percent rise in prices.8
The Council expects the unemployment rate to rise
slightly to 6.2 percent by fourth quarter 1979.
GNP in 1980 is forecast to rise at the same rate as
in 1979 — 9.8percent. The distribution between output
and prices is expected to be more favorable, however,
with output projected to rise 3.2 percent and inflation
to slow to 6.4 percent. Unemployment is predicted to
remain at 6.2 percent.
The CEA expects inflation to slow in 1979 for rca-
sons of demand-pull, that is, easing of pressure from
the spending side of the economy. Output growth is
projected to drop below its long-term trend. This
forecast differs markedly from the CEA forecast
7The CEA interpreted monetary actions as restrictive through-
out most of the year. See 1979 CEA Report, pp. 28, 47-53.
8Discussion of the outlook is found in the 1979 CEA Report,
Chapter 3. A comparison of the CEA’s forecast with a con-
sensus of private forecasters shows that they are not far apart.
The CEA tends to be abit more optimistic than the consensus,
but the differences arenot large.
Table IV
Forecasts for 1979 and 1980




ON? 9.8% 9.8% 7.5% 10.0%
Output 2.2 3.2 0.2 3.7
Prices 7.4 6.4 7.3 6.6
Unemployment (End of Period) 6.2 6.2 6.9 6.9
NIYI’E : Fi,n,res shot, rs for private rn’s’,’a,t’ a,estt’.-iage~.fur the
coo ferenec Jioanl. (‘hate Eeunnmc’trir,, Dat:i Res,,,sree— iv,.
si ituse. and the Wharton Eenn,,n’,etric F,,reea,,tirig Tilt’.
SL,us’ee (‘onierossee Huard Statistic& Bull, tin (Fib, nary
l9?~.
for 1978. Potential GNP is now seen as a con-
straint on the growth of output, and the projected
slowing of this growth is viewed as desirable in
order to reduce inflation. In early 1978, potential GNP
was estimated to be high enough, relative to the pro-
jection of output, for the CEA to consider demand
pressures a minor threat to reducing inflation.
The CEA has indicated that inflation is the No. 1
problem facing the nation’s policymakers. Despite the
limited role assigned to monetary and fiscal actions in
explaining the acceleration of inflation in 1978, the
CEA recommends a policy of “measured” monetary
and fiscal restraint.9 The Administration’s budget plan
is labeled “austere.”bO The basis for this label is that
the proposed growth of Federal outlays for fiscal
years 1979 through 1982 is less than the projected rate
of increase of GNP.
The Administration’s proposed budget plans on a
quarter-by-quarter basis are shown in Table V.” Ac-
cording to these figures, fiscal restraint, as measured
by the growth of expenditures relative to receipts, will
not become effective until calendar 1980. Continued
stimulus is projected through 1979.
/ A
The CEA’s discussion of monetary policy in 1979
and 1980 is sketchy. It stresses the importance of
monetary restraint, but does not recommend a pre-
°Ibid,,pp. 79-80, 93-97.
t0See The Budget of the United States Government for Fiscal
Year 1980, p. 12.
t1For a detailed discussion of the Administration’s budget elan,
see Charles A. Waite and Joseph C. Wakefield, Federal
Fiscal Programs,’ Survey of Current Business (February
1979), pp. 21-33.
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Table V
Administration Budget Plan: 1979 ond 1980
(Billions of Dollar,)
NATIONAL INCOME ACCOUNTS BUDGET HIGH-EMPLOYMENT BUDGET
Surplus’
Surplus ‘ Sus’plus ‘ Deficit as
Receipts Expenditures Deficit - Reeeiptu Expenditures , Doflcit 0,~ ofON?
1978 I $396.2 $448.8 $ 52.6 5413.9 $446.9 $--33.0 -1.6%
II ~, 424.7 448.3 —23.6 428.5 4470 --185 09
III . Actual 441.7 464.5 22.8 446.7 463.2 ‘-I 6.3 —08
IV 463.2 483.8 206 4595 482.8 23.3 -‘1 0
1979: Ii 460.0 490.3 ‘-30.3 4653 489.3 —24.0 1.0
II 469.6 4974 27.8 476.3 496.3 20.0 —0.8
Ill ‘ 478.0 514.8 ‘36.8 487.1 513.7 26.6 —1 1
IV I 488.0 526.8 ‘-38.8 499.2 525.6 —26.4 —1.1
?‘ Estimated
1980 I 508.2 536.9 287 523.6 535.7 ‘ 12.1 ‘05
II I 5205 5425 —22.0 536.1 541.1 ‘- 3.0 -02
III , 532.9 549.8 —16.9 547.3 548.4 - I 1 —0.0
NOTE E:timates f,,, higl:-c’mplc.,.m,’nt bud_n : ui I L’okI il Itu~erveBa’, I, if St. Lw s. UNI’ ho’,’ i, ,,~i,i,‘,..‘c,I a’- p. tt’nt,.sl UN P in
lion) usal tvnn
fc’rrcd growth rate for the major monetary ggregates.
Given past behavior patterns for Ml velocity, how-
ever, the 9.8 percent projected growth for GNP sug-
gests a growth in Ml of between 6 and 7 percent. Since 1974, the Administration has presented long-
Considering the effects of automatic transfers, one term projections for the economy and the budget
could interpret the Administration’s strategy as a call along with its short-term forecasts.’4 These long-term
for about a 3 to 4 percent growth in measured Mi.’2 projections were introduced into the economic plan-
The 1980 forecast of GNP indicates a continuation of ning process by the Budget Control Act of 1974.
this growth rate. Effective in 1979, however, the nature of these pro-
jections was changed by the enactment of the
Under the provisions of the Humphrey-Hawkins Humphrey-Hawkins Act. Previous Administrations
Act, the Federal Reserve must outline its strategy in were simply required to present these projections.
light of the Administration’s plan. The Federal Re- Under the Humphrey-Hawkins Act, these projections
serve presented its strategy to Congress on February must now be consistent with the Act’s long-term goals
20.” In its report, the targets of 1½ to 4½ percent for for unemployment and inflation.
Ml growth for the year ending fourth quarter 1979
were deemed consistent with the Administration’s
short-term goals. This range includes the 3 to 4 per-
cent Ml growth implied by the CEA’s GNP forecast,
that is, when account is taken of velocity growth and
the effects of automatic transfers. The movements of
the aggregates since late 1978, however, indicate that
this Ml range has not been met thus far in 1979.
Preliminary estimates indicate that Ml declined at a
2.3 percent rate in the first quarter. To achieve the
Federal Reserve’s target range, Ml growth would
have to accelerate to a 2.8 to 6.9 percent rate for the
rest of the year.
i1v:rA
.1 .N/.A/:.A.~J ~AA:A A: NP/:A A A.A..A:1 .AA.A~L/.~A N-NA
AAA A
A further constraint on long-term budget planning
was introduced in the Revenue Act of 1978. That Act
specified targets for the growth of Federal outlays
and their size relative to GNP, and presented a time-
table for achieving a balanced Federal budget. These
targets, however, are conditional and must be met
only if further tax reductions are to be enacted,
The Humphrey-Hawkins Act of 1978 specifies tar-
gets for economic policy in 1983. These targets consist
of reducing unemployment to 4 percent of the labor
force and lowering the inflation rate (as measured by ‘
2
Jolm A, Tatom and Richard W. Lang, “Automatic Transfers
and the Money Supply Process,” this Review (February ________
1979), pp. 2-10,
“Monetary Policy Report to Congress,” Federal Reserve Bul-




For a summary of the long-term projections made in past
years, see Keith M. Carlson, “Economic Goals for 1981: A
Monetary Analysis, this Review (November 1977), p. 3.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS APRIL 1979
the consumer price index) to 3 percent per annum.
The Act does not specify how to achieve these goals,
but it does suggest that monetary and fiscal policies
be supplemented with manpower policies and wage-
price guidelines.
The Budget document details the economic pro-
jections through calendar 1984 (Table VI), and
presents budget estimates through fiscal 1984. The eco-
nomic projections for 1981 through 1984 are not
presented as forecasts of probable economic condi-
tions. They are, rather, projections that assume prog-
ress toward the goals of the Humphrey-Hawkins
Act.” Only the budget estimates through 1982 are
intended to be budget plans. Projections for 1983 and
1984 are simple extrapolations beyond the planning
base.’6 The Administration does not offer a budget
plan designed explicitly to achieve the long-run
economic goals.
The CEA’s 1979 Annual Report discusses long-term
goals and some of the factors that will have a bearing
on their achievement.17 The discussion is general,
with no specific recommendations for monetary and
fiscal policy for achieving the goals. The CEA focuses
its discussion of the Humphrey-Hawkins Act on the
feasibility of achieving the inflation and unemploy-
ment goals simultaneously. In previous sections of its
report, the CEA suggests that a 6 percent unemploy-
ment rate indicates a tightness in labor markets which
causes wages to accelerate. Consequently, the CEA
concedes that the unemployment target cannot be
reached by means of monetary and fiscal policies
alone, and argues that structural initiatives to improve
the functioning of the labor market will also be
needed.
striving to reduce inflation with the help of wage-
price guidelines. The CEA does recognize the im-
portance of changing tax policy to encourage invest-
ment and thereby step up the growth of potential
GNP. Emphasis also is given to the improvement of
the social and economic regulatory process so that
incentives to produce and invest will not be damp-
ened further. The direct role of monetary expansion in
achieving the long-run inflation goals is not mentioned
by the CEA.
The other major constraint imposed on the Admin-
istration is specified in the Revenue Act of 1978. This
constraint is spelled out in terms of a timetable for
slowing Federal spending as well as balancing the
budget by fiscal 1983. Since budget estimates beyond
1982 are only extrapolations, these projections are
suggestive at best.
Table VII indicates that long-term budget projec-
tions do not fulfill the requirement of the Act. The
requirement of a balanced budget by fiscal 1982 is
met, but outlays as a percent of GNP are too large
in each of the years. The rate of growth of outlays
exceeds the rate of inMation by more than 1 percent
in every year but 1980.
The Administration’s economic plan does not con-
sider the implications of alternative growth paths for
the monetary aggregates. This is true for both the
short-term and the long-tenn projections. For pur-
poses of comparison, the Administration’s plan is
analyzed within the context of the St. Louis model.’8
t8
The model used here is a slightly modified version of that
described in Leonall C. Andersen and Keith M. Carison, ‘A





1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
GNP 11.6% 11.3% 9.5% 10.1 9.4% 7.9% 6.3%
Output 3.9 3.3 2.5 4.2 4.7 4.4 3.4
Prices 7.4 7.7 6.8 5.7 45 3.4 2.8
Unemployment rate 6.0 6.0 6.2 5.7 4.9 4.2 4.0
SOT~ItCE Tic Hadn’t of thi U,,;t.’d Stutes Cc’rI nur.’ ,, t ‘or k’.’s-oi I car J!’S~’.
The simultaneous achievement of the inflation goal,
on the other hand, is discussed within the context of
“See the discussion in The Budget, p. 37.
~~Ibid.,pp. 40-41.
“1979 CEA Report, pp. 106-134.
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Table VIII presents some alternatives to the CNP
path outlined by the Administration. The 4, 6, and 8
percent paths for Ml correspond to the Ml measure
before the introduction of automatic transfers. Each
of these paths was generated from first quarter 1979
as a starting point for Ml. According to these alterna-
tive simulations of steady money growth, the spirit
of the Humphrey-Hawkins Act is most closely met if
money growth is kept moderate. Each of the alterna-
tives indicates the difference between short-mn and
long-mn costs and benefits. Policymakers are con-
fronted with the difficult task of choosing between
short-term benefits and long-term costs.
Table VU
Long.Range Budget Projections: Unified Budget
(Billions of Dollars)
Actual Estimates Projectiar.,
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
Receipt,
Current services $402.0 $456.0 5504.5 $571.3 5646.6 $715.3 $777.8
Proposed changes —1.9 4.5 6.0 3.0 2.4
Budget receipts 402.0 456.0 502.6 576.8 652.6 718.3 780.2
Outlays
Currant services 450.8 491.3 536.1 577.8 610.6 640.2 567.1
Proposed changes 2.1 —4.5 0.2 4.3 5.4 6.6
Budget outlays 450.8 493.4 531.6 578.0 614.9 645.6 6737
Surplus/Deficit
Current services —48.8 —35.4 —31.6 —6.5 36.0 75.1 110.7
Proposed changes —2.0 2.6 5.3 1.8 2.4 4.2
Budget surplus/deficit ‘48.8 —37.4 --29.0 —1.2 37.8 72.7 1065
Outlays os% of GNP 22.1% 21.6% 21.2% 21.0% 203% 19.7% 19.35o
0/,, change in outlays 11.9 9.4 7.7 8.7 6.4 5.0 4.4
% change ;n ChIP deflator 6.8 7.9 7.0 5.9 4.8 3.6 2.9
Difference 5.1 1.5 0.7 2.8 1.6 1.4 1.5
NOTE: k’igure~a—’. f,,r tneal yrira.
SO URCE ?‘i’e Thudart o’ thr U,, t,d Sick, Go,’rra,ncri t for b’i.qr& 1’.ar 2980.
The model is used to project the course of infla- The purpose of presenting these simulations is to
tion and unemployment using the path for nominal show that, in the St. Louis model, the Administration’s
GNP containedin the Administration’s economic plan. GNP projections are not consistent with a path of
For purposes of the simulation, no impact was fac- steadily declining inflation. Given that this inflation
tored in for either the wage-price guidelines or for path is unlikely, the paths of output growth and
structurally-oriented programs to improve the func- unemployment are also brought into question.
tioning of the labor market. Table VIII summarizes
the results.
The St. Louis model indicates that, since inflation
was so rapid in 1978, its momentum will carry
through into the early 1980s, especially if monetary
and fiscal policies are stimulative enough to generate
GNP advances in the range of 9.5 to 10 percent. Even
with sluggish growth in output into 1981, the mo-
mentum of inflation is strong enough to more than
offset the downward pressures on prices associated
with that slow growth.
The inflation projection, along with the GNP path
assumed by the Administration, leaves little room for
real growth. As a result, unemployment rises steadily.
Then, in 1983 and 1984, if GNP growth is reduced
before the inflation rate has been lowered to any The Administration has developed a multi-faceted
great extent, output growth will be slowed further. economic plan for the nation. The problem confront-
Consequently, unemployment jumps sharply in 1983 ing the Administration in the short run is quite famil-
and 1984. iar — how to reduce inflation and unemployment
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Table VIll
Alternative Economic Projections: 1979-1985
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Ad mini stratia
ChIP 11.3% 9.5% ¶0.1°,,, 9.4% 7.9% 63%
Output 3.3 2.5 4.2 4.7 4.4 3.4 — -
Prices 77 6.8 57 4.5 3.4 2.8 .- -
Unempir.yn’.ort rate 6.0 6.2 5.7 4.9 4.2 4.0 ——
Si. Louis Model lAopraxinate
AdmirlkTratior, GNP Path)
CNP 11.5 9.8 9.9 9.3 8.0 6.4 5.8%
Output 3.8 22 1.8 1.3 0.9 0.7 1.8
Prices 7.4 7.5 8.0 7.9 7.0 5.6 3.9
Uner-playment rate 6.1 6.3 6.8 7.4 8.2 9.1 9.7
St. Louis Model ~4 percent
Ml growth from /79)
ChIP 10.0 6.9 7.0 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.2
Os.tput 2.6 0.3 1.2 2.5 3.9 4.8 5.3
Prices 7.3 6.6 5.9 4.6 3.2 2.3 1.9
Unemployment rate 6.4 7.5 8.3 8.6 8.4 7.8 6.9
St. Lajis Model (6 percent
Ml g’awth from 1/79)
CNP 10.5 9.0 9.3 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.5
Output 3.0 1.9 2.1 2.6 3.2 3.6 3.8
Prices 7.3 7.0 7.1 6.8 6.1 5.7 5.5
Unemploymer’t rate 6.3 6.8 7.! 7.4 7.4 7.2 6.9
St. Louis Model (8 percent
Ml growth from I ‘79)
ChIP 11.1 11.1 11.6 11.7 11.7 11.7 11.7
Output 3.5 3.5 2.9 2.3 1.8 1.6 1 8
Prices 7.3 7.4 8.5 9.3 9.7 10.0 9 8
Unemployment rate 6.2 6.1 6.0 6.3 67 7.2 7.2
siTfluItaiseOuslv. rh~~ \dln[nistration\ (‘t’i}lllsflhiC plan l’edtiiil spendIng Is being rUdllC’etI US i’,tj)id]’ as sng—
loetiseS oh the Pedcral budget suml tlit’ wage—price gested ill the Congressional p(iJlfl’ StZi.telnent.
guidelines. \tolletar’ pohe\ is diseussed “Ilk geli— The St. Louis issods’l wa’s used tO simulate fli~~ Ad—
er.slIy. ‘the potential wspaci of alternaii’ e course’ 01 ihilIlistratiOhiS plan. Isitsg the (A P ~fou th pat! pro-
1110fl1’iar\ expai~’ion is not assessed. ject~d in the _\dnunistratious. achievt’sssehst of the
. .. lhsmphrev-Ilawknss inilation and isnellipl(s\mciii tar
he ~dl1tsIiISLI’2ttsOfl prc’sehits projeetsons for the
gets does not anpear leassble In the .thsence of new
olsg term but clues not develop ,L 551’ ti ivhis’~ e the stmueturalls .orie:ded pl’ograuss. Fisrthennort’. altt’flia-
1~S3goals ot the I’bsiisphrc~-iIns kills Act. Its bud’ list’ c’oilI’seS oF InoIietar\ U\~iUIl5iO55indicate that the
get plan. lIo55eser. sshen ~inab icd s\ilhils tie t’ohite\t g~i~ ol UIihlphI’c’\-iIL\skiIl.~ ssill h1’ diflk”ult to achieve
of the Rt’venut’ Act ol l97’~ indie’ites that the ‘‘oaT ~ l9’~3. (he spirit of the .~ctwoisid appear to be
of a baianeed budget api)eai’s to be easii~islet. Then’ best mit b~’aiisii~~g toward a hiIudler.tte growth iii the
is ss 1fl11 is ’stion. howi’s er. whet!s~-s the gr asstli of sin n icy stiIrk.
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